Cargo Security In The Fog Of Battle
As expected, a serious, successful
attempt to ship a potent PETN bomb, cleverly and ingeniously built into
a printer toner cartridge, rattled the nerves and brought much attention
(not all helpful) to the challenge of round-the-clock cargo security.
As the reports come in, it turns out a last
minute tip from Saudi security was what saved the day; otherwise, the
device was virtually undetectable by currently deployed security screening
methods. Really good security is priceless; industrialized security measures
are not. You still need a human to put two and two together – common
sense is not a common computer application.
Congress and the TSA have dealt with cargo
carried on passenger aircraft; contrary to various domestic and international
press reports, it is at 100% levels in the U.S. and it works. What is
clear to the air cargo industry may not be totally as clear-cut to the
public at large. As usual the media, with its penchant of breathless reporting,
is no help. Quite the contrary – it adds much confusion and wrong
information to the issue.
There are distinct and well-defined channels
used by the forwarder/airline community that cater to commercial shippers.
Government has had “known shipper” in place for this type
of cargo for years. The recent regime for cargo on passenger aircraft
has resulted in a host of new and technologically advanced measures, rolling
the responsibility all the way back to the shipper in some cases. The
“heavy freight,” which over the years has become somewhat
more uniform, needs special screening methods and technology because of
its size and weight.
There are all-cargo airlines as well as
combination carriers that operate all-cargo aircraft; the cargo they and
the integrators are transporting is not affected by the same rules and
restrictions which apply to cargo carried on passenger aircraft.
The much-ballyhooed integrators provide
logistics services to commercial customers, albeit as a closed loop, whereby
these companies act as a single source logistics provider and an unbroken
chain of custody. The FedEx, UPS, DHL and TNT of the world operate all-cargo
aircraft.
The difference is that the integrators’
main business is retail, i.e., individuals and companies shipping envelopes
and small packages. In this case, the security measures are of a totally
different dimension, as they don’t involve purely commercial accounts
but instead persons who may have never shipped anything before and may
not ship again. It is impractical and impossible to throw a blanket security
regime for these types of shipments. Security is driven by the policies
and procedures of each integrator and the country in which they operate.
The processing of envelopes and small packages at major, specialized hub
facilities – Memphis, Subic Bay, Dubai, Stansted, Frankfurt; Louisville,
Cologne, Shanghai, Shenzhen; Bahrain, Leipzig, Cincinnati or Liege, Singapore
– lends itself for unique, highly mechanized sorting and screening.
Not all cargo is alike – the 21st
century terrorist masterminds seem to have realized that cargo on passenger
aircraft has become a much more challenging and therefore hostile environment,
although human-borne explosive devices are still being tried. The commercial
cargo chain of custody has held up well, therefore it is really no surprise
that the envelope and small package shipped by an individual, non-commercial
shipper has now had its global premiere as a newly devised means of delivering
a smart and lethal explosive device – thankfully, unsuccessfully.
It is encouraging that so far, resolve has
won and political correctness has lost, as Germany, France and Britain
have banned outright all cargo from Yemen and, in the case of Germany,
all passengers as well. I guess the U.S. is not quite there yet for whatever
reason. What about China, India and Russia? It is this type of action
that stands the best chance to drive a wedge between terrorists and a
host (witting or unwitting) country, which stands to suffer the consequences
of restrictions on its freedom of transportation and market access. In
my view, this is a far more effective response than yet again spending
billions on technology and security regimes, which, once in place, are
essentially obsolete, with terrorists quickly moving on to the next experiment
while we play catch up. Not to mention wreaking havoc on the global supply
chain.
Much more needs to be done; much more of
the most critical and time sensitive work will continue in the shadowy
world of espionage.
In a parallel vein, Forbes reported in September
that a Chinese botnet sells point-and-click cyber-attacks, with anywhere
from 2,000 to 10,000 new machines per day becoming infected with the malware.
Law enforcement if the U.S. is fully aware of the threat. E-freight, anyone?
Ted Braun |